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The Supplementary material consists of two parts. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the expert survey we conducted as well as information on the construction of the National Identity Longevity Index. Appendix B provides tables with variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and average marginal effects for individual-level variables used in the analysis reported in the paper.
Appendix A Towards measuring the longevity of national identity: Why an expert survey?
There is a shortage of data about the timing of the spread of national identity across the world. This is driven by the difficulty of collecting historical data about national identity. There are three main challenges.
The first challenge is that such data are difficult to assemble because identities are less tangible than indicators of economic performance or political institutions. For example, it is more straightforward to establish the date when a constitution was approved in a given polity than to establish the date when a majority of a polity's residents started to think of themselves as members of a nation. Thus, especially for periods prior to the rise of modern survey research, scholars have had only indirect evidence about the diffusion of identities.
There have been scattered attempts to find tangible indicators of the historical development of nationalism. This work is important and valuable. However, as noted in the main text of the paper, none of these measures were intended by the authors to capture the extent of the diffusion of national identity in a population. Centeno (2002) , for example, focuses on the timing of the construction of different types of monuments, some understood to be 'national'. There is no theoretical reason to suggest that the timing of monument construction can be used as a proxy for the diffusion of national identity. In fact, it is plausible that a numerically small group of nationalists with sufficient resources, even if out of step with the majority of a society's population, could construct such monuments. Centeno (2002: 179) himself observes that the monuments 'serve as an indication of what those who have enough power to construct such monuments want to remember or honor', a 'hierarchy of official memory'. Consequently, these monuments do not necessarily reflect the extent of the spread of national identity in a population. At the same time, we have little ground to expect that all polities turn to constructing national monuments after developing national identity. Finally, there may be difficulties in discerning which monuments are national and which ones are not. Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) focus on the emergence of 'nationalist organizations', typically those seeking independence or autonomy for the group they identify as their nation. It is unlikely that these nationalist organizations reliably indicate a given state of the diffusion of national identity. Their presence likely runs the gamut from substantially lagging the widespread diffusion of national identity to getting well out in front of the population's adoption of the identity (think, for example, of organizations dedicated to the creation of an independent republic of Vermont, which clearly do not reflect widespread Vermontian national identity).
The second challenge is that historical-textual material is not available to equal extents for the range of cases with which comparative scholars of nationalism are concerned. In principle, if there were adequate searchable textual material, we might be able to trace the diffusion of national identity through large-scale content analysis of pamphlets, speeches, and periodicals, perhaps making use of automated textual analysis tools. Some polities are extraordinarily well documented (such as 17 th century England, for which the Thomason tracts alone comprise more data than are available for most cases) and could usefully be studied in this way. Other polities have far less accessible documentation, however, and so at present this method does not seem appropriate for the assembly of comparable estimates about the diffusion of national identity across numerous polities. An additional concern with such an approach would be a bias towards literate expressions of national identity. Since one of the major debates about national identity concerns its relationship with literacy, this could be especially problematic.
The third challenge is that scholars have disagreed about now to best conceptualize and define national identity. The primary debate has been between 'primordialists' and 'modernists' (Smith, 1986) . The former tend to conflate national identity with collective identity more generally. The latter emphasize the distinctiveness of modern national identity, often emphasizing its incorporation of ideas about popular sovereignty and equality (Greenfeld, 1992; Anderson, 1991; Wimmer, 2012) .
Because of scholarly disagreements about how to define national identity, comparative secondary sources, such as the available encyclopedias of nationalism and national identity (e.g., Motyl, 2001; Herb and Kaplan, 2008) , are not reliable guides to the timing of national identity's diffusion. This is because authors of specific case studies in these sources do not share a common framework. This prevents us from taking the route outlined by Bockstette et al. (2002) in assembling their state antiquity index.
For these reasons, we believe that the knowledge of polity-level experts is the best source of information currently available concerning the timing of national identity diffusion. Therefore, we carried out an expert survey covering European and post-Soviet policies. To avoid challenge number three above, we asked each expert to provide his or her definition of national identity; we then excluded responses of experts who adopted a primordialist approach (see section Definition of national identity for more details).
We do not claim that the resulting index is perfect. Experts gave us their best available judgments about the timing of a complex phenomenon. They could, and often did, disagree, resulting in expert estimates that are sometimes more than a century apart for a given polity (see below). We tried to minimize bias in expert selection, but it is possible that some bias exists across communities of experts (e.g., historians of Germany relative to historians of France) that affects experts' estimates. Despite the caveats outlined above, we believe the index is (i) better than existing alternatives and (ii) a useful stand-in until further effort is invested to obtain even more valid and reliable measures for the timing of national identity.
Geographic focus of the expert survey
Our survey covered 48 polities in the 'wider Europe,' comprising traditional European polities as well as all post-Soviet polities (including those not traditionally understood to be 'European').
We focused on these polities for several reasons. First, scholars of nationalism have often argued that modern national identity emerged in Europe and spread across the world through a process of global diffusion (e.g., Wimmer, 2012; Greenfeld, 1992) . Second, we expected such polities to be relatively well-documented and to have a large number of potential expert survey respondents available for such cases. Third, since we were focusing on European polities, which included some post-Soviet states, it made sense to include all post-Soviet polities as a group, both because of Soviet nationality policies and because other researchers (e.g., Wimmer, 2012) have found that diffusion effects of nation-states tend to happen within imperial systems, of which the Soviet system of states and satellites could be considered a variant. Finally, we expected that predicted outcomes of the longevity of national identity (e.g., contemporary national pride, institutional and economic performance, etc.) would be well-documented in these polities.
In the paper, we use data for 36 out of the 48 polities covered by the survey (see Table 1 in the paper). The 36 polities constitute the largest set of polities for which we could obtain data on the individual-level and polity-level controls utilized in our empirical analysis.
Identifying experts
Expert identification itself imposed a challenge, since there is no central registry of experts on the subject. We used several strategies to identify experts. First, we began by writing to members of several history departments in the United States, selecting those faculty members with expertise on one of the polities covered by our survey. Second, we hired consultants to help us identify experts for several sub-regions. Brian Porter-Szucs (History, University of Michigan) provided recommendations of experts for Central and Eastern Europe, Scott Radnitz (Political Science, University of Washington) for a number of the post-Soviet cases and Jelena Subotic (Political Science, Georgia State University) for polities in the Balkans and Southern Europe.
Third, we used Google Scholar and examined the tables of contents for the journal Nations and Nationalism for a ten-year period (volume year 10 to volume year 20) to identify authors of articles and books on nationalism and national identity for polities covered by our survey.
Fourth, we asked scholars who responded to the survey to nominate other experts on their polities. Finally, for the remaining cases at the end of the process we searched for experts based on an informed ad hoc basis, with the aim of identifying historians and area studies scholars who focused on the polities of our interest.
Between June 2014 and September 2015, we sent invitations via email and provided our respondents with access to a web-based survey. We sent 805 invitations in total and received 165 responses, for an overall response rate of approximately 20.5%. Potential respondents were offered the chance to win one of ten $100 Amazon gift cards as an incentive to complete the survey. Table A1 provides data on the number of invitations, responses, and response rates by polity. We gave respondents the option to be credited or to remain confidential. In the Acknowledgments section of this appendix, we list only those experts who indicated that they would like to be credited.
Survey questions
The first three questions of the survey focused on the historical timing of the spread of national identity at three threshold values: (1) among at least a small group within the polity, (2) among political elites, and (3) among the majority of residents of the polity. Each question had a followup question asking respondents to rate the level of confidence they had in the estimate.
Additional questions that we asked focused on the type of national identity (civic vs. ethnic), the definition of national identity that the respondent used, and other cases of national identity (e.g., minority nationalisms) found in the polity of expertise.
For purposes of this paper, and in order to construct our National Identity Longevity Index, we draw on two questions from the expert survey. The first question is: 'Please identify the one-third century during which you believe a majority of the residents of your polity of expertise first adopted national identity.' Possible responses range from 'never' to every one-third 
Definition of national identity
We had to make coding decisions when analyzing experts' responses. In the initial stages of the survey, we imposed a strict definition of national identity, drawing on the modernist definitions of Greenfeld (1992) and Anderson (1991 Anderson ( [1983 ). However, a number of potential respondents indicated discomfort with being provided a strict definition. To tackle that issue and concerns about the length of the original survey, we revised our survey and launched a shortened version used for eliciting all remaining expert responses (16 respondents completed the long survey; 149 respondents completed the shorter survey). In the shortened version of the survey, and thus for the majority of the respondents, we did not impose a definition of national identity. Instead, we asked respondents to date the development of national identity with respect to our three thresholds and to provide the definition of national identity they used when doing so. One consequence of this revised approach was that we received some responses that were clearly given by 'primordialists' (those respondents who see national identity as a phenomenon present in most times and places (see Smith (1986) , as discussed above)). Conceptualizing and defining national identity from this point of view, although valid, diverges from the focus of our study, which employs a modernist conception of national identity to study its effect on national pride.
We adopt a modernist perspective because modernist view of national identity is the dominant view among scholars of nationalism and because contemporary national pride, the outcome of our interest, is most likely impacted by national identity defined from a modernist perspective.
For this reason, we excluded from the construction of our index the responses submitted by experts who adopted a non-modernist perspective. To identify those responses, three project staff members independently examined the definitions provided by respondents and highlighted those that seemed to be non-modernist. In many cases, the decision on whether to include or exclude a response was straightforward in that many respondents would explicitly state that they relied on a specific definition of national identity (e.g., by Anderson (1991) or by Gellner (1983)), thereby clearly signaling their modernist or non-modernist perspective. In other cases, a bit more judgment was required. If an expert offered a definition but their definition was unclear,
staff looked at open-ended responses to other questions we asked in the survey for information about whether respondents viewed nationalism and national identity through a primordialist or modernist lens. There was considerable overlap in our judgments about the perspective of the responses. In those relatively few cases where our views diverged, we carefully read all relevant responses, communicated and jointly made a decision on whether the perspective was modernist or not. We only excluded responses when we felt quite confident that the perspective was a nonmodernist one or when answers were so vague that it was impossible to make a judgment. We describe these cases in detail in the Expert responses by polity section below.
In addition, we excluded two responses (one for Slovenia and one for Iceland) for which the experts did not answer the definition question and one response (for Spain) that clearly was focused not on the main case of national identity in a polity but exclusively on peripheral or regional nationalisms. Altogether, we eliminated 18 responses, leaving us with 147 total responses for 48 countries. For the analysis in paper, we use 119 responses for 36 countries.
Expert responses by polity
The following section provides a detailed description of all expert responses by polity as well as our comments when a decision was made to exclude a specific response. We excluded one response because the respondent did not answer the question regarding timing of the spread of national identity among the general population.
Greece: 6 respondents. We excluded one response based on the answer to the definition question, which read 'Acting on the basis of a belief being a member of a polity (broader than a local community and not a church), e.g., being subject of a king, being a member of the estates of the kingdom, nowadays being a citizen'. Most modernist scholars (e.g., Greenfeld, 1992; Anderson, 1991) would see estate identity as distinct from and opposed to modern national identity.
Iceland: 3 respondents. 
Constructing the National Identity Longevity Index
To construct our index of the longevity of national identity we proceeded as follows. First, for each expert's response to the question 'Please identify the one-third century during which you believe a majority of the residents of your polity of expertise first adopted national identity', we assigned one point for every one-third century since the passing of that threshold. responses. Often, the experts' responses match. Sometimes, however, they do not, which should not be surprising given the complexity of the historical unfolding of national identity across polities. We therefore used the expert's responses to the question 'How much confidence do you have in the accuracy of your estimate?' to compute a weighted average, with experts' confidence levels serving as weights, of the above-described discounted expert-specific sub-indices for each polity. The response 'no confidence' was assigned the weight of 1, 'reasonable confidence' the weight of 2, and 'high level of confidence' the weight of 3. The resulting versions of the National Identity Longevity Index, one for each discount rate, are reported in Table A2 .
Finally, for purpose of empirical analysis and for ease of interpretation, we also computed the normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index. To this end, we divided the above-described index (weighted average of the above-described discounted expert-specific sub-indices) by its maximum possible value (in our sample, the value for Portugal). Hence, our normalized country-level index of the longevity of national identity ranges between 0 (no history of national identity) and 1 (longevity of national identity for Portugal, our maximum). The resulting normalized versions of the Longevity of National Identity Index, one for each discount rate, are reported in Table A3 . Table 1 in the paper provides the values of the normalized version of the National Identity Longevity Index using 5% discount rate for 36 out of the 48 countries covered by our expert survey.
Assessing the plausibility of the index
How accurate are the estimates of the longevity of national identity based on our index? There is, of course, no straightforward way to fully corroborate expert estimates with alternative data: if there were, we would turn to those data for our analyses. To provide a first examination of the plausibility of the estimates implied by our index, we therefore conducted an illustrative comparison of the values of our index for a set of three polities from three distinct regions covered by our sample with secondary source coverage on the emergence of national identities for these respective polities.
Our choice of secondary source coverage is Alexander Motyl's Encyclopedia of Nationalism, a multi-authored work that includes entries for many cases as well as about a variety of themes in the study of nationalism and national identity. It should be recalled that the entries in the Encyclopedia of Nationalism (and secondary sources on the subject more generally) do not rest on population surveys that would allow precise estimates of the timing of emerge and the diffusion of national identity. In essence, all historical judgments about the timing of the spread of national identity in all sources should be treated as inherently uncertain estimates. Moreover, the dates at which national identity had spread to the majority of a polity's population cannot be extracted or inferred from the Encyclopedia of Nationalism entries, which provide no such specific dates. What we do here, instead, is examine whether general narratives about the history of nationalism in chosen polities are broadly consistent with the estimates implied by our index.
Our first example is Hungary. The non-discounted, non-normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index for Hungary is 5.2 (see Table A2 Our second example is Denmark. The non-discounted, non-normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index for Denmark is 5.5 (see Table A2 ). In other words, the estimate implies that the majority of residents first adopted national identity in the middle of the century. From 1864, according to the entry (Motyl, 2001: 116) , after the loss of predominantly German territories, 'the need to strengthen the sense of Danishness from within the remaining parts of the kingdom, as a counter against further losses to the south, was an immediate concern'. The entry further treats 'the cultural creation of identity for Denmark' as a process carried out via 'periodic newspapers, hymns, clubs, and in the folk high school movement' of the 19 th century (Motyl, 2001: 116) . This suggests that widespread adoption of national identity in Denmark indeed took place in the middle of the 19 th century indeed.
Our third example is Turkmenistan. The non-discounted, non-normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index for Turkmenistan is 4 (see Table A2 ). The estimate implies that the majority of residents first adopted national identity in the first one-third of the 20 th century. This is quite consistent with the entry on Turkmenistani nationalism in the Encyclopedia of Nationalism. According to this entry (Motyl, 2001: 551) , there were 'tribes' of Turkmen extending back into the medieval era, but it was only after the Stalinist period 'with the emergence of mass literacy and the new intelligentsia, and a relaxation of the repression [that] modern Turkmenistani nationalism began to emerge'.
In sum, our preliminary, small-scale analysis suggests that the estimates of the longevity of national identity based on our National Identity Longevity Index are broadly consistent with historical narratives about the timing of emergence of national identity. We leave it to future work to further evaluate and refine our approach. Government Effectiveness Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Score ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.
World Governance Indicators 2007
Socialist Dummy variable equal to 1 if country was a member of the former socialist bloc and 0 otherwise. Alesina et al. (2003) Linguistic Fractionalization Measure of linguistic heterogeneity. Computed as one minus the sum of squared linguistic group shares. Reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different linguistic groups. Higher values correspond to greater heterogeneity. Alesina et al. (2003) Religious Fractionalization Measure of linguistic heterogeneity. Computed as one minus the sum of squared religious group shares. Reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different religious groups. Higher values correspond to greater heterogeneity. Alesina et al. (2003) (continued below) Household Annual Income I Dummy equal to 1 if responder's reported annual household income is in the interval I and 0 otherwise. H{1,2,…,12}, where 1 is less than 1,800; 2 is 1,800 to 3,600; 3 is 3,600 to 6,000; 4 is 6,000 to 12,000; 5 is 12,000 to 18,000; 6 is 18,000 to 24,000; 7 is 24,000 to 30,000; 8 is 30,000 to 36,000; 9 is 36,000 to 60,000; 10 is 60,000 to 90,000; 11 is 90,000 to 120,000; 12 is more than 120,000. The amounts are measured in Euros.
Authors' calculation based on EVS

EVS 2008, v353YR
Married Dummy equal to 1 if responder's marital status is married or in registered partnership and 0 otherwise.
EVS 2008, v313
Children Dummy equal to 1 if responder's number of children is one or more, and 0 otherwise.
EVS 2008, v321
Voter Dummy equal to 1 if responder indicated that (s)he would vote in a general election.
EVS 2008, v263
Left Political Views Dummy equal to 1 if responder identified him or herself as being 1, 2 or 3 on the political scale (where 1 is left and 10 is right) and 0 otherwise.
EVS 2008, v193
Center Political Views Dummy equal to 1 if responder identified him or herself as being 4, 5, 6 or 7 on the political scale (where 1 is left and 10 is right) and 0 otherwise.
Right Political Views Dummy equal to 1 if responder identified him or herself as being 8, 9 or 10 on the political scale (where 1 is left and 10 is right) and 0 otherwise.
Father Immigrant Dummy equal to 1 if responder's father is an immigrant and 0 otherwise.
EVS 2008, v309
Mother Immigrant Dummy equal to 1 if responder's mother is an immigrant and 0 otherwise.
EVS 2008, v311
Unemployed Dummy equal to 1 if responder's employment status is unemployed and 0 otherwise.
EVS 2008, v89
Religious Dummy equal to 1 if responder identifies as religious and 0 if responder identifies as non-religious or convinced atheist.
EVS 2008, v114
Confidence in Government G Dummy equal to 1 if responder's level of confidence in government equals G and 0 otherwise. G{1,2,3,4}, where 1 is none at all; 2 is not very much; 3 is quite a lot; 4 is a great deal.
EVS 2008, v222
Interest in Politics P Dummy equal to 1 if responder's level of interest in politics equals P and 0 otherwise. P{1,2,3,4}, where 1 is not at all interested; 2 is not very interested; 3 is somewhat interested; and 4 is very interested. 
EVS 2008, v186
